
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### THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON



March 8, 1955

Dear Allen:

Enclosed is a copy of a self-explanatory letter which was transmitted to me on January 28, 1955, by Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI, and a copy of my reply.

In view of the reference in this correspondence to evaluations made by the IAC's National Indications Center, will you consider the same and let me have an expression of your views.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT CUTLER/
Special Assistant
to the President

By the way at what twee drd you get the tAC Evaluation that day?

The Honorable Allen W. Dulles Director Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D. C.

**FBI REVIEW COMPLETED** 

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### THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

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March 3, 1955

Dear Edgar:

I belatedly acknowledge your letter of January 28, 1955, concerning the information reported to the FSI by an anonymous individual who claimed that he was an agent of an unidentified foreign country, and that he had placed atomic bombs for detenation at various places in New York City, Philadelphia, and Washington, D. C.

Four letter notes that the anonymous report, in addition to being sent by the FBI to me in behalf of the President, was disseminated by the FBI to several local police agencies, the intelligence agencies of the Government, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Secret Service, and the National Indications Center. Your letter also reports that later on garbled versions of the report were circulated (to the effect that atomic devices had been found and alerts were being called).

Your letter suggests: (1) the necessity for taking positive steps to insure in the future a calm, businesslike evaluation of such information; (2) that consideration be given to an NSC direction to all interested agencies to process such matters in an orderly and accurate manner; and (3) that such information should be promptly evaluated at the National Indications Center, followed by prompt distribution of such evaluation to interested agencies.

My accurate recollection of this matter is as follows. Your office telephonically advised me about 3:00 P.W. on January 27th, of the above-mentioned anonymous report. I temporarily deferred calling it to the attention of the President, inasmuch as the anonymous source of the information had been stressed. Instead, I telephoned to the Director of Central Intelligence who is Chairman of the IAC, which is responsible for making evaluations relating to such reports (as provided in MSC 5438, approved by the President on November 30, 1954). As of that time, Mr. Dulles had not been personally apprised of the report: he indicated that he would check into it immediately. Thereafter, I talked briefly on the telephone with Mr. Sanders and relayed the Bureau's information to second Goodpaster at the White House, emphasising at the time the anonymous origin. By 4:00 P. M. Colonel Goodpaster and I concluded that we should apprise the Chiefs of Staff of the report and its anonymous nature, and then tell the President that the information was being evaluated by the intelligence community. This was done. In view of the President's reactions, I took no further action in this connection.

Under these circumstances: (1) I do not believe the garbled stories or the calling of alerts which followed upon the FBI's dissemination were in any way attributable to the action of Colonel Goodpaster and myself. (2) It

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is possible that garbled stories might have resulted from communications to various local police agencies. (3) I believe that NSC 5h38 includes policy determinations covering the suggestions made in your letter in that it provides for (a) channeling information (such as the anonymous report referred to above) to the National Indications Center; (b) analysis and evaluation of such information by the IAC agencies; and (c) prompt reporting of conclusions resulting from such evaluations to the appropriate agencies.

In view of NSC 5438, I question whether it is necessary to raise this matter with the Council. However, I have referred copies of your letter and this reply to Mr. Allen Dulles for consideration of your comments concerning prompt evaluations of such reports by the IAC's National Indications Center.

Sincerely yours.

ROBERT CUTLER Special Assistant to the President

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover Director Federal Bureau of Investigation U.S. Department of Justice Washington, D. C.

14 March 1955

# MEMORANDUM FOR: General Cutier The White House

You may recall that the other day when we were discussing at the Security Council the problem of travel of Soviet and Satellite nationals to the United States, Herb Brownell mentioned that the returnees from the Evanston Assembly of the World Council of Churches had indulged in severe criticism of the US, and that the visit had not inclined the visitors in question to alter their expressed hostility to the USA. Herb's statement as regards these particular people is borne out by a rather exhaustive examination which I have made. Of course in this particular case there were involved individuals who were psychopathically hostile to the United States.

The Czechoslovakian and Hungarian delegates, particularly Bishop Peter of Hungary and Bishop Hromadka of Czechoslovakia, were the leaders in the hostile propaganda. Most of their statements were based upon the following accusations or complaints:

- a. Visa restrictions limiting travel and speeches.
- b. Surveillance by U.S. "secret police".
- c. Fingerprinting of delegates ("Not only the Chicago gangsters but the Archbishop of Cnaterbury, too, was fingerprinted. There is democracy for you.")
- d. Distortion of news by the U.S. press and its "bad attitude" toward the satellite delegates (especially Bishops Peter and Hromadka).
- e. Dissemination of false information about these delegates (especially Bishop Peter) by U.S. official sources. U.S. refusal to allow the Hungarian delegation to hold a press conference for the purpose of denying these charges.

- f. Congressman Bentley's telegram to Bishop Bereczky sequesting the Hungarian delegates to testify before his subcommittee of the House Committee on Communist aggression.
- g. Attempts by the American Legion, "that fascist organization of war veterans", to discredit the satellite delegates.
- h. The difference in opinion and attitude toward the satellite delegates between the American religious leaders at Evanston and the "Washington and Ohio provocateurs".
- i. Picketing against Bishop Hromadka by emigres at Evanston.
- j. Crime wave in Chicago: references to shootings and sex crimes which occurred during the period of the Assembly "while the police were more occupied with the Hungarian delegates than with the murderous gangsters".
- k. "There is a great difference between the common American man and the present leaders of American politics...the masses have long decided about the question of peace or war."
- 1. "The concept of peaceful coexistence between nations is gaining strength...the U.S. concept of power politics has lost its popular appeal entirely".
- m. "The front page of the Christian weekly shows an American father who, with two pistols in his hand, is forcing his child to take castor oil."
- m. Bishop Peter referred to an Evanston memorial to World War II dead which bears the inscription; (December 7, 1941 - blank). The failure of local officials to insert the second date was interpreted by the Bishop as proof that the war has not ended, as far as the U.S. is concerned.

AWD: at Distribution:

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REMEN

Allen W. Dulles Director

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West Bebby:

I have your letter of I March enclosing Mr. Hoover's letter of 20 January and your rapty regarding the amonymous call of an alleged A-Book placement here in this country.

in reference to Mr. Hoover's remarks about the evaluation and dissemination procedure of the IAC Indications Couter, this procedure was followed in this case by the Center. It served as an excellent exercise for them, and the timing of their actions, as you will see, was proupt.

You called me about 3 o'clock. I then had the Indications Center alerted, and within 25 minutes the Indications Center had come up with their analysis and began passing it to the watch Committee. One hour and 20 minutes after my alert of the Indications Center, we had a coordinated Watch Committee evaluation. We then polied the IAC members themselves, and final IAC evaluation was complete two hours and five minutes after my call. Colonel Goodpaster at the White House was kept advised at each stage of the above process.

In the course of this exercise several problems were uncovered, particularly in the initial notification process. Based on this experience, we have taken certain steps to insure the early alert of the Indications Center.

Macerely.

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Milen W. Dulles Director

The Resemble Report Cutler Special Assistant to the President Executive Office Building Bashington, D. C.

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# UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

C O P

March 14, 1955

Washington 25, D. C.

VIA LIAISON

Honorable Robert Cutler Special Assistant to the President Executive Office Building Washington, D. C.

Dear General Cutler:

Reference is made to your letter of March 8, 1955, in which you made certain observations regarding the situation which arose following the receipt of an anonymous telephone call regarding the placing of atomic bombs in certain localities.

This Bureau, of course, notified certain local police agencies not only because they were a part of the local civil defense organization, but also because they would have been notified in any event of serious alleged threats against the safety of the public. The garbling of information which resulted in certain civil defense alerts being called occurred on a state and local civil defense organization level. The circumstances have been discussed with the Honorable Val Peterson, Federal Civil Defense Administrator, and he has expressed the opinion that the Regional Control Center in Pennsylvania should not have relayed the information to other Regional Centers without coordination through the Federal Civil Defense Administration headquarters.

It is possible that Governor Peterson's efforts to tighten procedures through his Agency and prompt evaluation of reports through the machinery of the Intelligence Advisory Committee will enable the responsible agencies to meet a similar situation in the future with a minimum of confusion.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ J. Edgar Hoover

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#### CONFIDENTIAL

#### UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

### Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington 25, D. C.

January 28, 1955

VIA LIAISON

Honorable Robert Cutler Special Assistant to the President Executive Office Building Washington, D. C.

Dear General Cutler:

At noon, January 27, 1955, the New York Office of the FBI received an anonymous telephone call. The caller stated he was an agent of a foreign country and when asked what foreign country, he stated, "You know what country." The anonymous caller then stated he had just placed A-Bombs in the Pennsylvania Station, Grand Central Station, The Hotel Roosevelt, the Empire State Building, and several other places in New York City. He further stated that A-Bombs had been placed in localities in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Washington, D.C., and were set to go off at midnight. The caller refused to give his name, and there was insufficient time to trace the call.

Pursuant to established procedures in the discharge of this Bureau's responsibilities, the local police agencies in the communities mentioned were advised, the intelligence agencies of the Government were informed, as well as the Atomic Energy Commission, Secret Service, and the National Indications Center at the Pentagon.

By late evening of January 27, 1955, a garbled story was circulating to the effect that atomic devices had been found, and alerts were being called.

The garbled version of the original information disseminated by the FBI and the alerts on the part of state and local Civil Defense organizations points up the necessity for positive steps to be taken prior to another such incident to insure a calm, businesslike evaluation of such data.

You may wish to consider the desirability of the National Security Council's directing all interested agencies to process such information

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#### CONFIDENTIAL

in an orderly and accurate manner. You may also wish to consider the desirability of the National Indications Center's evaluating such data promptly upon receipt and furnishing such evaluation to the interested agencies of the Government so that even in the event of an actual discovery of an atomic device there will be a minimum of hysterical reaction.

The FBI will continue to bring to the attention of intelligence and defense agencies of the United States Government matters coming to our attention which may be pertinent to the national security. The FBI will also continue to refer to the local police agencies such matters as have a definite local angle which might be alleviated or prevented by prompt police action.

I am bringing to the attention of the Honorable Val Peterson, Federal Civil Defense Administrator, my concern over the garbling of the data furnished on the part of local Civil Defense people and other local officials. The contents of this letter are also being brought to the attention of the Attorney General and Mr. James C. Hagerty, Press Secretary to the President.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ J. Edgar Hoover